Read judgments with context

The petitioner’s passport was impounded by the Government under the Passports Act, 1967, in the public interest, without prior reasons or a hearing.

Must a law that restricts personal liberty provide a procedure that is fair, just and reasonable, and how do Articles 14, 19 and 21 relate to one another?

The Court read Article 21 together with Articles 14 and 19. A “procedure established by law” cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, and a law affecting liberty must satisfy each Article that applies.

Fairness is part of Article 21, and arbitrary state action is open to challenge. How the principle works for a given statute still depends on its terms and the facts.

Petitions challenged Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which punished certain online messages, after arrests over social media posts.

Did Section 66A violate freedom of speech and expression, and was it saved by the reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2)?

The Court distinguished discussion and advocacy from incitement. It held Section 66A vague and overbroad, with a chilling effect on speech, and struck it down. It also read down the intermediary takedown rules and upheld Section 69A with safeguards.

Vague criminal laws on speech can be struck down. Online expression receives constitutional protection, subject to restrictions that fit within Article 19(2).

A challenge to the Aadhaar scheme led to a reference to a nine-judge Bench on whether the Constitution guarantees a right to privacy.

Is privacy a fundamental right under the Constitution of India?

The Bench held that privacy is intrinsic to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and to the freedoms in Part III. It overruled earlier decisions to the extent they said otherwise, and set out that any interference must meet tests of legality, legitimate aim and proportionality.

Privacy is a fundamental right. The decision does not decide every privacy dispute, and later cases apply its tests to specific laws.

The head of a Kerala mutt challenged state land-reform laws and constitutional amendments that limited judicial review of property rights. A 13-judge Bench heard the case.

How far can Parliament amend the Constitution under Article 368?

A majority held that Parliament has wide power to amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, but cannot alter its basic structure or framework.

The basic structure doctrine. The list of basic features has been developed case by case since.

The petitioners challenged parts of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, which limited judicial review of amendments and gave Directive Principles priority over certain Fundamental Rights.

Is Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution limited, and can it make that power unlimited by amendment?

The Court struck down the challenged clauses. It held that the limited nature of the amending power is itself part of the basic structure, and that the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is essential to the Constitution.

Parliament cannot give itself unlimited amending power. Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles must be read in harmony.

Several state governments were dismissed and President’s Rule imposed under Article 356. In Karnataka, the Chief Minister said he still had a majority in the Assembly.

Is the President’s satisfaction under Article 356 open to judicial review, and on what grounds?

A nine-judge Bench held that a proclamation under Article 356 is subject to judicial review. It said majority support should be tested on the floor of the House, and treated secularism as part of the basic structure.

Article 356 is a limited, reviewable power. Federalism and secularism are basic features of the Constitution.

A 1990 government order reserved 27% of civil posts for socially and educationally backward classes, following the Mandal Commission report.

Is reservation for backward classes valid under Articles 15(4) and 16(4), and what limits apply?

A nine-judge Bench upheld reservation for backward classes. It held that the “creamy layer” must be excluded and that reservation should ordinarily not exceed 50%.

Sets the basic framework for OBC reservation. Later amendments and cases have addressed other questions, so check the current law.

Petitions challenged Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code to the extent it criminalised consensual sexual conduct between adults of the same sex.

Does Section 377 violate Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 when applied to consensual adult conduct?

A five-judge Bench held it unconstitutional to that extent, relying on dignity, autonomy, equality and constitutional morality. It overruled the 2013 decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal.

Constitutional morality, not social morality, guides the Court. Consensual same-sex conduct between adults is not a crime.

A petition challenged Section 497 IPC (adultery) and Section 198(2) CrPC. The offence could be committed only by a man, and the woman could not be prosecuted.

Is the adultery offence consistent with Articles 14, 15 and 21?

A five-judge Bench struck down the provisions. It held that they treated a married woman as her husband’s property and denied her autonomy and equal treatment.

Adultery is no longer a criminal offence. It can still be relevant in civil matters such as divorce.

After the gang rape of a social worker in Rajasthan, women’s groups filed a petition about the lack of legal protection against sexual harassment at the workplace.

Can the Court lay down enforceable guidelines to protect working women when no legislation exists?

Relying on Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 and on international conventions, the Court issued binding guidelines to prevent and address workplace sexual harassment.

Courts can fill a legislative gap. The guidelines were later replaced by the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.

Pavement and slum dwellers in Bombay challenged eviction from the places where they lived and worked.

Is the right to livelihood part of the right to life under Article 21?

The Court held that the right to life includes the right to livelihood, because losing one’s livelihood can mean losing the means to live. It added that the right can be restricted by a fair procedure established by law.

Livelihood is protected by Article 21. Eviction must follow a fair procedure, but the case does not create a right to occupy public land.

The accused was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The case raised the constitutional validity of the death penalty.

Is the death penalty under Section 302 IPC and the related sentencing provision constitutional?

A Constitution Bench upheld the death penalty by a majority but held that it should be imposed only in the “rarest of rare” cases, after weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Life imprisonment is the rule and death the exception, decided case by case. Later cases keep refining how the test is applied.

A father said the police did not register an FIR when he reported the kidnapping of his minor daughter.

Must the police register an FIR under Section 154 CrPC whenever information discloses a cognizable offence?

A Constitution Bench held that registration is mandatory when the information discloses a cognizable offence, and that no preliminary inquiry is permitted then. A short, time-bound preliminary inquiry is allowed in limited categories of cases.

Police cannot refuse to register an FIR where a cognizable offence is disclosed. Section 154 CrPC is now Section 173 of the BNSS, so check the current text.

A husband sought anticipatory bail in a case under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The Court noted a pattern of routine arrests.

Should police arrest automatically in offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, or must they first apply statutory conditions for arrest?

The Court held that arrest is not a matter of course. Police were directed to apply the arrest criteria under Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and record reasons, and magistrates were told to check those reasons before authorising detention.

Arrest needs recorded justification. The CrPC has since been replaced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, so check the corresponding provisions now in force.

A company advertised a £100 reward to anyone who caught influenza after using its smoke ball as directed, and said it had deposited £1,000 at a bank. Mrs Carlill used the ball as directed and caught influenza.

Was there a binding contract, or was the advertisement a mere sales “puff”?

The Court held that the advertisement was an offer to the whole world, accepted by anyone who performed its conditions. The bank deposit showed serious intention, and notice of acceptance was not required.

Leading case on unilateral offers and acceptance by performance. Section 8 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 reflects the idea.

A minor mortgaged his property to a moneylender in return for a loan, and later sought to cancel the mortgage.

Is a minor’s agreement void or voidable, and can the lender recover the money?

The Privy Council held that a minor’s agreement is void from the start under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, so there is nothing to ratify. The lender could not recover the money from the minor under the restitution provisions.

A minor’s agreement is void in India. The case is a standard reference on capacity to contract.

A mill’s crankshaft broke. A carrier delayed delivering it to the repairers, and the mill owners claimed the profits they lost while the mill stood idle.

How remote can losses be before a party is no longer liable to pay damages for breach?

The Court held that damages cover losses arising naturally from the breach, or losses that both parties could reasonably have contemplated when making the contract. The carrier did not know the mill would stop without the shaft.

Sets the remoteness rule for contract damages. Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 follows a similar approach.

Oleum gas leaked from a fertiliser plant in Delhi, harming people nearby. The Court considered the liability of enterprises that carry on hazardous activities.

What standard of liability applies to an enterprise engaged in an inherently dangerous activity?

The Court laid down a rule of absolute liability. Such an enterprise must compensate those harmed, without the exceptions available under the English rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, and compensation can be linked to the enterprise’s size and capacity.

India applies absolute liability for hazardous industries. It is a key case on environmental and industrial accidents.

Mrs Donoghue drank ginger beer from an opaque bottle that allegedly contained a decomposed snail. A friend had bought it, so she had no contract with the manufacturer.

Does a manufacturer owe a duty of care to a consumer with whom it has no contract?

By a majority, the House of Lords held that it does. Lord Atkin’s “neighbour principle” says one must take reasonable care to avoid acts that could foreseeably injure people closely affected by them.

Foundation of the modern law of negligence. Indian courts have referred to it when developing tort law.

The petitioners challenged the Constitution (First) Amendment Act, 1951, which restricted property rights to allow land reform, arguing that it violated Fundamental Rights.

Does “law” in Article 13 include a constitutional amendment, so that an amendment can be struck down for violating Part III?

The Court held that the power to amend under Article 368 is different from ordinary law-making, and that “law” in Article 13(2) means ordinary law. The amendment was upheld.

An early view that Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights. Later cases, ending with Kesavananda Bharati, limited this power through the basic structure doctrine.

A political leader was detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and challenged his detention under Articles 13, 19, 21 and 22.

Did the Act violate Fundamental Rights, and what does “procedure established by law” in Article 21 mean?

The majority upheld most of the Act. It read “procedure established by law” as the procedure laid down by a valid law, without requiring that it be fair or reasonable, and treated Articles 19, 21 and 22 as separate codes.

A narrow reading of Article 21 that was later displaced by Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.

During the Emergency of 1975, many people were detained, and a Presidential order suspended the right to move courts to enforce Articles 14, 21 and 22.

Could detainees ask High Courts for habeas corpus to challenge their detention during the Emergency?

By a majority of four to one, the Court held that they could not. Justice H.R. Khanna dissented, holding that liberty does not depend on Article 21 alone.

The decision was widely criticised. In Puttaswamy (2017) the Court said it was wrongly decided. The 44th Amendment now prevents suspension of Articles 20 and 21 in an Emergency.

A senior civil servant challenged his transfer from the post of Chief Secretary, arguing that it was arbitrary and violated Articles 14 and 16.

What does equality mean under Articles 14 and 16, and can arbitrary state action breach it?

The Court described equality as a dynamic concept and said arbitrariness is opposed to equality. Arbitrary state action therefore violates Article 14. The petition itself failed on its facts.

The “arbitrariness” test for Article 14. Later cases used it to strike down both executive actions and laws.

A person convicted of murder while serving a life sentence faced Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code, which made the death sentence mandatory in such cases.

Is a mandatory death sentence consistent with Articles 14 and 21?

The Court struck down Section 303. It held that a mandatory sentence that gives the judge no discretion to consider the circumstances is unfair and arbitrary.

Courts need discretion in sentencing. Check how the BNS now treats similar situations.

A former Chief Minister was questioned by the police in a corruption case and was prosecuted after refusing to answer questions.

How far does the right against self-incrimination in Article 20(3) apply during police investigation?

The Court held that the protection covers the stage of police questioning and can be claimed for answers that might incriminate. It said a person cannot refuse to answer every question, only those with that risk.

The right against self-incrimination applies at the investigation stage, not only in court.

Reports showed that very large numbers of undertrial prisoners in Bihar had been in jail for longer than the maximum sentence for their alleged offences.

Does Article 21 include a right to a speedy trial and to free legal aid?

The Court held that a speedy trial is part of the fair procedure required by Article 21. It ordered the release of many undertrial prisoners and stressed free legal services for those who cannot afford a lawyer.

Speedy trial and free legal aid are part of Article 21, supported by Article 39A.

The accused sought anticipatory bail in a criminal case, and the High Court had refused it.

What principles should guide a court deciding an anticipatory bail application, and how does it relate to personal liberty?

The Court stressed that Article 21 protects liberty and that anticipatory bail should not be refused on a rigid formula. It listed factors such as the nature of the accusation and the risk of the accused absconding, and said each case depends on its facts.

Anticipatory bail is closely tied to liberty and is decided on the facts. It is now dealt with in Section 482 of the BNSS.

A husband promised to pay his wife a monthly allowance while he worked abroad. The couple later separated, and the wife sued for the payments.

Was the arrangement a legally enforceable contract?

The Court held that it was not. Agreements between spouses living together are presumed not to be intended to create legal relations.

Intention to create legal relations is needed for a contract. The presumption for domestic arrangements can be rebutted in some situations.

A company agreed to develop land and sell plots, but wartime requisition of the land caused delay. The buyer asked for his money back, saying the contract was frustrated.

Was the contract discharged by frustration under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872?

The Court held that the doctrine of frustration in India is governed by Section 56, which covers supervening impossibility in a wider sense. On the facts, the delay was not enough to end the contract.

Section 56 is the Indian home of frustration. Mere hardship or delay is usually not enough, and the question is whether the foundation of the contract is destroyed.

A mill owner built a reservoir on his land. Water escaped through old mine shafts and flooded a neighbour’s coal mine.

Is a landowner liable for damage caused when a dangerous thing he brought onto his land escapes, even without negligence?

The House of Lords held that a person who brings onto his land and keeps something likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril, and is liable for the natural consequences of its escape.

The rule of strict liability. India went further with absolute liability in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India.

Salomon sold his business to a company he formed and held almost all its shares and debentures. The company failed, and creditors claimed his debts.

Is a company separate from its members, or merely their agent, so that the controlling shareholder is personally liable?

The House of Lords held that a company properly incorporated is a separate legal person, even if one person owns nearly all of it.

The foundation of separate legal personality. Courts lift the corporate veil only in limited situations.

Two shareholders sued the company’s directors for misusing company property.

Can individual shareholders sue for a wrong done to the company itself?

The Court held that the company is the proper claimant for a wrong done to it. It would not interfere with internal irregularities that the majority could ratify.

The proper plaintiff rule and the majority rule. Exceptions exist, for example where there is fraud on the minority.